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HEALTH CARE FOR TRIBAL CITIZENS:





When Ms. Florence Red Dog was refused emergency inpatient
mental health care at the South Dakota Human Services Center
after the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court found her to be mentally ill
and in need of immediate commitment for her own protection, a
great legal controversy arose in the federal courts. The questions
presented by the facts were many, but the federal courts nar-
rowed the questions to one: whether the federal government or
the state of South Dakota had to pay for emergency inpatient
mental health care for an indigent member of the Pine Ridge In-
dian Reservation.
In justifying its refusal to provide the emergency medical treat-
ment to an Indian resident of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation,
the state argued that federal law and treaties required that South
Dakota treat Indian persons residing on an Indian reservation
differently from other persons in South Dakota. Moreover, it
argued that South Dakota was precluded by federal law and treaty
from assuming jurisdiction over the commitment of a mentally ill
person residing on the reservation.'
The federal government argued that it was not its duty to pro-
vide the required medical treatment. It asserted that the action of
South Dakota in preventing the emergency medical treatment was
a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, as well as of Title 27
of the South Dakota Compiled Laws. As a remedy, it sought to
enjoin the officials of South Dakota from continuation of such il-
legal practice.2 The attorney for the guardian ad litem argued the
same position.
The district court rejected the federal government's arguments.
It held that on the basis of the infringement of tribal government
*J.D., North Dakota, 1972. Tribal Attorney, Oglala Sioux Legal Department, Pine
Ridge, S.D.
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Hasting College of Law.
Guidance provided by Ababinilli and Ma'heo'o. Errors of interpretation are mine.
1. White v. Matthews, 420 F. Supp. 882, 884 (D.S.D. 1976).
2. Id. at 885.
3. Id. at 884.
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test 4 the state and counties of South Dakota had no power to in-
itiate or to carry out the commitment of an allegedly mentally ill
Indian person who resides on an Indian reservation.' The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. 6
The rationale of the federal courts was that the law imposes no
duty on the state of South Dakota to provide mental health care
for members of tribes who reside upon an Indian reservation,
that federal policy placed responsibility for health care upon the
United States and that the federal government cannot evade that
responsibility by insisting that the state of South Dakota assume
the primary burden for providing health care for Indians residing
upon an Indian reservation. 7
Al parties to this litigation stipulated to the facts in the case.
Their interpretation of the facts, however, were quite selective.
To illustrate this point, neither South Dakota, the Department of
Justice, nor the plaintiff's attorney stressed the fact that a tribal
extradition order by Judge Steven Hawk authorized the commit-
merit of Florence Red Dog to the nearest facility to protect her as
well as other people on and off the reserve. This occurred after
the mental hospital had rejected the request of a federal
psychiatric social worker. The Attorney General of the state of
South Dakota refused to comply with the tribal court order. He
stated that state facilities did not have jurisdiction to commit
tribal members who are located within the boundaries.'
All parties stipulated that the Indian Health Service hospital on
Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, which is operated by the federal
government, did not have the facilities to treat people with men-
tal illnesses that require civil commitment or physical restraint or
who constitute a serious danger to themselves. All parties also
stipulated that patient care monies were available to the state
facility from the federal government at the contemporary rate.
All parties also agreed that the selected state facility was the
nearest and was equipped to provide the necessary treatment.9
It is difficult to understand how the facts could yield to a deter-
mination that South Dakota was justified in not accepting a tribal
court order on the grounds that it would infringe on the powers
4. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
5. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977).
6. 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978).
7. Id. at 697-98.
8. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 545-47 (D.S.D. 1977).
9. Id. at 551-52.
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of tribal government over the reservation. If anything, the facts
seem to urge that the question of the nature of tribal extradition
orders is controlling on the issue of "full faith and credit." On the
other hand, from a constitutional perspective, issues arise
concerning the right of a public health facility to deny emergency
services to an indigent person on the basis of that person's
residence and federal-tribal citizenship, and whether eligibility for
state-provided services are limited solely to citizens of the state.
Also raised is the issue of discrimination in federally subsidized
mental health services in South Dakota.
The failure of the federal courts to address these fundamental
issues is a failure of the judicial process. Issues were avoided by
the lawyers and the courts that in good conscience ought not to
have been ignored. They failed to apply familiar principles of law
to the facts because the person was a member of an Indian tribe.
Instead of- looking to federal law in general, the lawyers and
judges confined themselves to the concept of tribal sovereignty in
federal Indian law. While in most cases this is appropriate, in this
case of first instance, it is the writers' position that courts must
reason downward from the constitutional relationship between
tribes and the United States of America to relevant federal laws
addressed in the subject matter, then to federal Indian law. Such
a method, we suggest, can restore continuity and principles to the
federal law respecting the rights of the tribe and its members in
allocating governmental powers in American federalism.
II. Infringement or Extradition?
The Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee ° held that state courts
had no jurisdiction over civil suits for causes of action arising on
reservations. The declaration by the Court of the relationship be-
tween state jurisdiction and tribal jurisdiction stated that "absent
[any] governing Act of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the rights of reservation In-
dians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.""1 Under
this test the question of whether a state action infringed on the
rights of tribal government is found only if there is no applicable
federal statute.
Based on the stipulated facts of the case, it is difficult to con-
clude that an extradition and commitment order of a tribal court
10. 385 U.S. 217 (1958).
11. Id. at 220.
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is a grant of jurisdiction to South Dakota that infringed upon the
right of tribal government. There was no question raised in the
court that the tribal court order was unlawful or that it was an
unauthorized delegation of tribal power to the state. Yet, the
district court viewed the situation as an issue of utilization of
state jurisdiction on a reservation because it failed to consider the
refusal of the state to honor the tribal court order. When it did
look at the crucial tribal order, it was viewed as a prohibited
delegation of civil jurisdiction to South Dakota. 12 The court of
appeals ignored these issues totally in reviewing the case.13
The analysis of the state procedures for involuntary commit-
ment, resulting from the view that the tribal order was a pro-
hibited delegation of civil jurisdiction to South Dakota, was cor-
rect as to the infringement test of Williams v. Lee, supra.
However, it was an unnecessary analysis because there was no
absence of federal law governing the situation: treaties, constitu-
tional provisions, the Indian Reorganization Act, and relevant
federal law concerning health service delivery were all in ex-
istence. More important, however, the state of South Dakota had
modified its position in the pleadings to assert that Indians who
are physically present within state boundaries are within the
jurisdiction of the state. This change in pleading should have
crystallized the issues of extradition and full faith and credit be-
tween subordinate units of American federalism. It did not.
'o understand this conceptual failure by the lawyers and
federal courts, we shall first have to provide a conceptual stan-
dard to review the court's actions. That standard is the relation-
ship between treaty federalism and constitutional federalism. Sec-
ond, we shall address the issue of an extradition order of a tribal
court under treaty federalism and federal law.
A. Constitutional Authority and Treaty Federalism
Federalism in the United States is not always a question of
federal and state sovereignty and jurisdiction. While the issue of
federal and state sovereignty is the controlling focus of constitu-
tional federalism, there is also the question of treaty federalism in
certain states of the Union.
Treaty federalism is an analytical concept that describes the
legal relationship between the Indian tribes and the federal and
12. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 550 (D.S.D. 1977).
13. White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978).
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state governments. It was created in the legal history of certain
territories as the boundaries merged to either tribal reservations
or states.14 In those certain areas, of which the state of South
Dakota and the Pine Ridge Reservation are a part, the federal
government and the Indian tribes agreed to limit the tribal do-
main and delineated "permanent" homes for the Sioux tribes. 5
Subsequently, however, the federal goverment forged the ceded
tribal territory into a territory, and then admitted the territory to
the Union as a state. In recognizing the territory, which sur-
rounded the tribal reservation as a state, the federal government
and the state agreed that the state was not to have any jurisdic-
tion over the territory of the Indian tribes, i.e., tribal reserva-
tions.
The Enabling Act for the state of South Dakota states:
That the people inhabiting said proposed states do agree and
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the un-
appropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof,
and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any
Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be
and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and
said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction
and control of the Congress of the United States; .
[N]othing herein, or in the ordinances herein provided for,
shall preclude the said States from taxing as other lands are
taxed any lands owned or held by any Indian who has severed
his Tribal relations, and has obtained from the United States
or from any person a title . . . save and except such lands as
have been or may be granted to any Indian or Indians under
any act of Congress containing a provision exempting the lands
thus granted from taxation.
1 6
In the Constitution of South Dakota, Article XXII, called
"Compact with the United States," which is irrevocable without
the consent of both the United States and the people of South
Dakota, states:
[T]he people inhabiting the State of South Dakota, do agree
and declare that we forever disclaim all right and title to lands
14. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD, INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY
(1980).
15. See 1 S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 103-20 (1967).
16. Id. at §§ 184-85.
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[South Dakota], ... owned or held by any Indian or Indian
tribes; . . . and said Indian lands shall remain under the ab-
solute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United
States; ... But nothing herein shall preclude the state of South
Dakota from taxing as other lands are taxed any lands owned
or held by any Indian who has severed his Tribal relation and
has obtained from the United States, or from any person a title
thereto by patent or other grant save and except such lands as
have been or may be granted to any Indian or Indians under
any act of Congress containing a provision exempting the lands
thus granted from taxation.'
7
These legal compacts establish the condition of both constitu-
tional federalism and treaty federalism working within what ap-
pears administratively as the territory of the state. No mention is
made in the federal-state compacts as to tribal jurisdiction. Both
are seen as analytically separate, even though in the same
geogaphical boundaries of road maps. Legally they are separate
entities united by different instruments to the federal govern-
ment.
Under these conditions, the questions of jurisdiction have two
distinct levels of analysis. The first level is of constitutional
federalism, while the second level is treaty federalism. The first
question is whether under the constitutional allocation of
sovereignty the federal government or state government controls
the affairs of Indian tribes. The second question is whether the
federal government has limited the inherent sovereignty of the In-
dian tribes over their citizens, or has delegated some federal
authority to the states which is confirmed and ratified by the
tribal citizens in accordance with Section 1326 of Title 25 of the
United States Code.'
The "great outline" of constitutional federalism was ex-
pounded by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland,9 while the "great outline" of treaty
federalism was expounded by the Court in Worcester v.
17. Id. at 490. This is the key section of the South Dakota constitution that state
defendants urged in their Memorandum in opposing summary judgment (Jan. 17, 1977).
They state: "What the United States overlooks is that it withheld from South Dakota the
jurisdiction to incarcerate mentally ill reservation Indians. So the United States is left with
the argument that, by following the jurisdictional disclaimer imposed by the United
States, South Dakota is racially discriminating .... All South Dakota laws must be read
in light of this federally created and imposed disclaimer." Id. at 2.
18. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 80.
19. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Georgia.20 The author of both of these opinions was Chief Justice
Marshall, the great federalist.
Under the first level of analysis, the Constitution of the United
States is controlling. The Constitution allocated competence and
political power to both the federal and state governments. It
allocates jurisdiction and competence to either the federal govern-
ment by its expressed terms, or to the state governments under
the ninth and tenth amendments. Article VI of the Constitution
established the principle that federal treaties, laws, and statutes
are the supreme law of the land.21 The Executive and the Senate
are granted the power to create treaties with the Indian tribes,
and Congress is granted the ultimate bounds of competence and
power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.22 Under the
authority of the Constitution, the states were divested of any
competence or jurisdiction they had over Indian affairs under the
Articles of Confederation. 3
The second step of analysis is treaty federalism. The control-
ling authorities are the treaties and the legislation that im-
plemented the treaties against the background of constitutional
federalism. The fundamental principle of treaty federalism is that
Indian tribes have inherent sovereignty based on the consent and
will of tribal citizens. 24 This power could only be limited by the
federal government under the Constitution, as only the federal
government could make treaties and regulate the commerce with
Indian tribes. Thus, the mechanism of limiting the power of the
Oglala Sioux Tribe was by treaties and agreements with the
federal government.
Under Article VI of the Constitution, Indian treaties are the
supreme law of the land. 2s As the supreme law of the United
States, they created a political compact between the federal
government and the Oglala Sioux Tribe similar to the position the
states held under the Articles of Confederation, as well as defined
the basic framework of the rights and obligations of each party
under the political alliance.
Once a framework of political compact was agreed upon, both
the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the federal government implemented
20. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
21. U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
22. Id., art. 1, § 8, 3.
23. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-60 (1832).
24. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1958 ed.) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW].
25. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
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the obligations. Under the authority of the commerce clause,
Congress passed legislation implementing the federal
government's promises and obligations to the tribes, and under
tribal law the Oglala Sioux Tribe implemented its promises and
obligations.
In the earliest decision of the Supreme Court on the relation-
ship of Indian tribes to constitutional federalism, the Court firmly
established the framework of treaty federalism. Treaties, accord-
ing to the Court in Worcester v. Georgia, explicitly
recognize the national character of the Cherokees, and their
right of self-government; thus guarantying their lands; assum-
ing the duty of protections, and of course pledging the faith of
the United States for that protection; has been frequently
renewed, and is now in full force.
To the general pledge of protection have been added several
specific pledges, deemed valuable by the Indians. Some of
these restrain the citizens of the United States from en-
croachments on the Cherokee country, and provide for the
punishment of intruders.
From the commencement of our government, Congress has
passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians,
which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest
a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties
stipulate. 6
Similarly, Felix Cohen noted in his Handbook of Federal In-
dian Law that:
The substantive provisions of the first Indian trade and inter-
course act fulfilled some obligations assumed by the United
States in treaties with various Indian tribes.
The foregoing analysis of statutes as fulfillments of treaty
obligations would probably apply equally to each of the later
Indian trade and intercourse acts, culminating in the perma-
nent act of June 30, 1834.27
This is not to say, however, that the Oglala Sioux Tribe became
an instrument or creation of the federal government. Like all In-
dian tribes, the Oglala Sioux was a separate sovereignty from the
26. Id. at 556-57.
27. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 24, at 64-70. See also F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY IN THE FoRMATiv YEAiS (1962).
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federal government, united by their treaties into a confederation
with the United States of America. 28 The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that the tribal governments are distinct from the
federal government.
29
Rather than federal instrumentalities, the Indian tribes are said
to be merely under the protection of the federal government
against any encroachments on their rights to tribal sovereignty
and government. This concept of dependence and protection is
the core of treaty federalism.
In Worcester v. Georgia, the Chief Justice clearly established
the nature of this "dependence." Dependence, was, he implied, a
legal pretense, which tribes had tolerated out of ignorance of its
implications:
Not well acquainted with the exact meaning of the words, nor
supposing it to be material whether they were called the sub-
ject, or the children of their father in Europe; lavish in profes-
sions of duty and affection, in return for the rich presents they
received; so long as their actual independence was untouched,
and their right to self-government acknowledged, they were
willing to profess dependence on the power which furnished
supplies of which they were in absolute need, and restrained
dangerous intruders from entering their country; and this was
probably the sense in which the term was understood by
them.3 0
Even when a tribe had expressly consented by treaty to have
the United States "regulat[e] trade with the Indians, and to
manag[e] all their affairs," this cession did not abrogate their
right to self-government or sovereignty. As the Chief Justice
held:
To construe the expression . . . into a surrender of self-
government, would be, we think, a perversion of their
necessary meaning, and a departure from the construction
which has been uniformly put on them. . . . It is equally in-
conceivable that they could have supposed themselves, by a
28. HAiNEs, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS,
1789-1835 (1960), at 90-98.
29. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544 (1975); Mescalero Apache Tribes v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1895); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
30. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546-47 (1832).
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phrase slipped into an article on another and most interesting
subject, to have devested [sic] themselves of the right of self-
government on subjects not connected with trade.3
Dependence, therefore, is merely descriptive of the federal
government's legal and political obligation to protect tribal
governments from foreign and internal encroachments on their
treaty rights and inherent sovereignty. "This relation was that of
a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more
powerful," the Court concluded in Worcester, "not that of in-
dividuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as
subjects to the laws of a master." ' 32 Therefore, "[p]rotection does
not imply the destruction of the protected. ' 33
The states, under the controlling principles of treaty
federalism, have no original jurisdiction over Indian tribes. They
have neither civil nor criminal jurisdiction. In Worcester the
Supreme Court summed up this position when it stated, "The
treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian ter-
ritory as completely spearated from the States; and provide that
all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the
government of the Union."' 3' Whatever jurisdiction the states
could possess over Indian tribes had to be specifically delegated
to them from the federal government.3 Accordingly, absent such
specific delegation of federal jurisdiction to the states, coupled
with the consent of the involved tribe or tribes, either the federal
government or the tribal government has such jurisdiction. This
31. Id. at 554.
32. Id. at 555.
33. Id. at 552.
34. Id. at 558. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw, supra note 24, at 116-17.
35. See FEDERAL INDiAN LAW, supra note 24, at 117. See also, e.g., Pub. L. 280, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321 et seq. This is a thorny constitutional problem. Whether the federal
goverrnent can delegate its constitutional power to regulate commerce to the states is an
unresolved question. The Supreme Court has not yet spoken to this issue. The position of
the tribe is that it cannot. This is an issue that was originally resolved by the ratification
of the Constitution by the thirteen state conventions, where the states firmly delegated
their power over Indian tribes to the federal government. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832). Only an amendment to the Constitution could effect any
new allocation of political power under the Constitution.
It should be remembered that state representatives establish federal law and policy.
.While there is a distinction between federal and state interests in constitutional
federalism, the lack of representation of tribal interests in Congress creates a merger be-
tween federal and state interests in every congressional law.
[Vol. 7
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concept is the foundation of the "plenary power of Congress
over Indian tribes" or "federal preemption." 6
Similar to the principles of constitutional federalism, the
essence of treaty federalism is the allocation of law-making and
law-applying competence between the federal and tribal govern-
ments on the reservations. This allocation of competence or
jurisdiction, i.e., the power of the legislature and the courts to
create and affect legal relationships with respect to persons or
property in such a way as will be given recognition in courts of
another state or federal government, in principle and application,
respects and effectively accommodates both tribal and federal in-
terests." Similar to the position of the state law in constitutional
federalism, the displacement of tribal law by federal law is in-
terstitial. Federal law and policy begins with respect for tribal
sovereignty, builds upon the concept, and takes account of
federal and state interests before passage of any limitations on
tribal sovereignty.
The process of accommodating the interest of constitutional
federalism, i.e., state and federal interest, with the framework
and interests of treaty federalism, always involves a federal statute
or a court's general acknowledgment of tribal power and specific
delineations of when the tribes cannot exercise law-making and
law-applying competence, as well as when particular state and
federal interests can limit tribal power. In the modem federal
statutory scheme, the accommodation is acknowledged in the In-
dian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934,38 delineated by the In-
dian Civil Rights Act of 1968,39 and supplemented by the Indian
Self-Determination Act of 1975.40
In United States v. Wheeler,41 a unanimous Court reaffirmed
that the controlling law between tribal and federal jurisdiction,
interests, and power is the inherent theory of tribal powers and
specific limitation that Congress has placed on the exercise of
that power. Tribal powers are not delegated power from the
federal government but are only limited by specific treaty obliga-
36. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); FEDERAL INDLAN LAW, supra note
24, at 119-21.
37. See the last paragraph of note 35 supra.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
39. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq.
40. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 et seq.
41. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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tions and stipulations and specific congressional limitations of
tribal power. 2
In United States v. Wheeler, the Court also emphasized that in
matters that "involve only the relations among members of a
tribe," the power of self-government is necessarily greater than
the power to regulate the affairs of non-Indians. The Court also
noted that both the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, supra,
and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, supra, merely affirmed
the inherent sovereignty of the tribes. These acts did not create
the source of tribal government.
B. The Extradition Order of the Tribal Court
As a principle of treaty federalism, the Oglala Sioux Tribe
under the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie has the sole right to inter-
sovereign extradition. The source of this authority is the first arti-
cle of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, which provides:
If bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or
depredation upon the person or property of any one, white,
black, or Indian, subject to the authority of the United States,
and at peace therewith, the [tribe] herein named solemnly agree
that they will, on proof made to their agent and on notice by
him, deliver up the wrongdoer to the United States, to be tried
and punished .... 11
The judicial interpretation of an identical treaty provision in
State ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle" established the principles that (1)
the Indian Reorganization Act substituted the Indian tribe, i.e.,
the tribal courts, for the federal agent in terms of authority on
the reservation; (2) the state does not have extradition jurisdiction
over Indian residents on the tribal reservation (a Cheyenne Indian
on the Navajo Reservation) unless (a) it can point to a specific
congressional statute that authorizes such delegation, or (b) a
valid order has been entered by the tribal court; and (3) absent
either a tribal court order or specific delegation, the states cannot
assume or share in the extradition proceedings without infringing
on the right of tribal self-government of the Indian tribe on the
tribal reservations. 4
42. Id.
43. Incorporated into I S.D. COMP. LAWS §§ 104-20 (1967).
44. 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969).
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Under this judicial interpretation of tribal power, the tribal
courts are the sole courts that have the civil power to bind the
residents personally to obedience. It is the sole court that has suf-
ficient "contacts" and subject matter jurisdiction over residents
to order their extradition to federal or state authorities.
The state of South Dakota has no subject matter jurisdiction or
in personam jurisdiction on tribal reservations. Only a tribal
court can order a reservation resident extradited to the jurisdic-
tion of the state. Once a tribal citizen is physically present in the
state, then the state has in personam jurisdiction.
The district court lost sight of this principle in its original
holding, when it held that the state had no jurisdiction over tribal
citizens."4 Later, it attempted to correct this holding and con-
cluded that the state procedures for admission to the county
health facility would infringe on tribal sovereignty and self-
government.47 The tribe fully agrees. But a crucial fact is ignored
by the district court. This crucial fact is that the state should
respect and honor the tribal procedures as a matter of "full faith
and credit" in civil matters. Otherwise, there is no method under
the current law to obtain jurisdiction over a person on a tribal
reservation.
The central case on this point is United States v. Cox.4 In Cox
the Court concluded:
Th[e Indian] tribes are not only within our jurisdiction, but the
faith of the nation is pledged for their protection. In some
respects they bear the same relation to the federal government
as a territory did in its second grade of government, under the
Ordinance of 1787 [under the Articles of Confederation]. Such
territory passed its own laws, subject to the approval of Con-
gress, and its inhabitants were subject to the Constitution and
Acts of Congress. The principal difference consists in the fact
that the [Indian tribes] enact their own laws [under the restric-
tion of treaties and acts of Congress].... This, however, is no
reason why the laws and proceedings of the [Indian tribes], so
far as relates to rights claimed under them, should not be placed
upon the same footing as other territories in the Union. It is
not a foreign, but a domestic territory... under our Constitu-
tion and laws. 9
46. White v. Cafifano, 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977).
47. Id.
48. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855).
49. Id. at 103.
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A more recent case is Jim v. CIT Financial Services Corp. s0 In
this case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico rejected 'the
repossession of a pickup truck from the Navajo Reservation as
legal because the agents of the finance corporation failed to file
an action of replevin with the appropriate tribal court. In
reaching its conclusion, the court stated:
We agree with the dissenting opinion of Judge Hernandez in-
sofar as he held that the laws of the Navajo Tribe of Indians
are entitled by Federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, to full faith and
credit in the Courts of New Mexico because the Navajo Nation
is a "territory" within the meaning of that statute."
The court also recognized that a state need not subordinate its
own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another
sovereign.
The tribe agreed with the reasoning of the New Mexico
Supreme Court and urged this as controlling law. In White v.
Calffano, 2 a county medical facility rejected a tribal court order
for commitment of a tribal citizen in a dangerous mental state.
The tribal court did not request a waiver of state statutes and
standards; it merely authorized the involuntary commitment and
extradition to obtain medical care of a tribal citizen. The county
could have applied the state procedure after receipt of the pa-
tient. There is no necessity for the state to intrude where the
tribal judiciary has the sole power and duty to maintain orderly
relations among its citizens under the modern federal statutory
accommodation.3 From this perspective, the central question
presented is not jurisdiction of either the state or tribe but a mat-
ter of intergovernmental cooperation.
The position of the state on this issue is a source of confusion.
In its initial pleadings, it took the position that tribal citizens
residing on the reservation were not subject to state court
jurisdiction, even if physically present. 4 In later pleadings, it
modified its position and said that tribal citizens are within state
jurisdiction if physically present off the reservation at the time
the petition is filed." Nevertheless, from a reading of the state's
50. 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975).
51. Id. at 752.
52. 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
54. Government's Brief at 16, n.52.
55. Id. at 16. n.53.
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Memorandum and the two district court opinions, White v. Mat-
thews 6 and White v. Califano,5 7 the state continued to argue its
original position that this was an "on the reservation issue" over
which the state had no jurisdiction. This theory is in conflict with
the facts. This admission should have been dispositive of the issue
of jurisdiction in the case.
Both the actions of the county board and the Attorney General
raise a novel issue. They contend that the state of South Dakota
does not have in personam jurisdiction over tribal residents in the
state because they do not have subject matter jurisdiction over
conduct of tribal citizens on tribal reservations. If this is still the
position of the state of South Dakota, then the Oglala Sioux
Tribe can argue the converse position: that the state has no
criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal citizens in the ceded land
called South Dakota.
In rejecting any responsibility for forcing Florence Red Dog to
remain on the reservation by confusing in personam jurisdiction
for subject matter jurisdiction, the state argued in its Memoran-
dum that:
Like the Plaintiff, Federal Defendants overlook the federally
imposed disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian activities on In-
dian reservations. The Fall River County Board of Mental Ill-
ness, as a creation of the South Dakota legislature, can have
no more jurisdiction over Indian activities of the Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation than the legislature possessed pursuant to
the State Constitution.
53
The foregoing statement is correct as a principle of constitu-
tional federalism, but the facts simply do not support its applica-
tion.
The state maintains this position even when a tribal citizen is
physically present in the state (outside the reservation). This is the
original position of the state that created this litigation. This must
apply to criminal as well as to civil jurisdiction. "All South
Dakota laws," according to the Attorney General of South
Dakota in his Memorandum to the district court, "must be read
in light of this federally created and imposed disclaimer. '
56. 420 F. Supp. 882 (D.S.D. 1976).
57. 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977).
58. Government's Brief at 2.
59. Id.
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The state cannot reject the delivery of medical and mental care
to tribal citizens because of their place of residence, on one hand,
and then on the other hand, arrest and incarcerate tribal citizens
for criminal violations when they are physically present in the
state. The disclaimer of jurisdiction in the South Dakota constitu-
tion must be applied uniformly and equally."
In terms of financial burden, the incarceration of tribal
residents in the prison system of South Dakota is more costly to
the state than the provision of medical services to indigent tribal
citizens where the federal government cannot provide medical ser-
vices.
Moreover, the state's position may have some logical con-
sistency with the recent holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe.6' In Oliphant the Court held that the criminal jurisdiction
of the tribal courts is limited only to tribal citizens or Indian
residents, but does not extend to state citizens. By converse logic,
based on the same policy the Court expressed in Oliphant, about
the foreign legal culture and racial juries, a court could hold that
state courts only have criminal jurisdiction over state citizens and
not over tribal citizens. If this is the logic of the state of South
Dakota, then the Oglala Sioux Tribe is in full agreement. This
position appears to be consistent with comments of the Attorney
General of South Dakota, as quoted in a newspaper.
As an issue of federalism, however, this position may be
repugnant to the court or Congress. Judging by the amended
judgment of the district court, entered on October 17, 1977, this
would appear to be the situation. Hence, the question is one of
"federalism," not residence. This issue is whether a member state
of the United States can ignore a just and proper tribal court
order for involuntary commitment, where the tribal court is the
only authorized court under federal law that can commit the
federal and tribal citizens within its jurisdiction. Alternatively, it
is a question of whether a member state of the United States can
reject a request by the federal government under authority of a
tribal court for involuntary commitment, where the federal
government has custody of the federal and tribal citizen. The
60. See S.D. CONsT. art. 22.
61. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
62. Rapid City Journal, Mar. 9, 1978, at 2. The paper reported that the Attorney
General stated, "That test case which went to the United States Supreme Court yesterday
(Monday) was a test case from the State of Washington, but it was basically funded by
the State of South Dakota. That was really our lawsuit." He also stated that about
$20,000 was spent in preparation of the brief by the state of South Dakota.
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answer these writers urge is that as principles of federal citizen-
ship or treaty federalism, there is no jurisdictional bar to a tribal
extradition and commitment order to a state or county medical
facility in the absence of federal facilities.
We can see no difference between involuntary commitment to a
federal facility or a state facility. Neither a federal nor a state
facility are part of tribal government or tribal jurisdiction. It is an
odd argument of federalism that holds that an Indian can be
committed to a federal institution on the authority of a tribal
court order, but cannot be committed to a state institution on
such an order. The Court has already determined that in terms of
law and order, there is a distinction between tribal interests and
federal interests. 63 It would necessarily follow that there is also a
distinction between tribal interests and state interests.
The district court decided that such intergovernmental
cooperation, which is common in constitutional federalism, is
violative of the Supreme Court's holding in Kennerly v. District
Court.64 Our position is that this case is quite distinguishable
from the instant case. In Kennerly the question was of a tribal
council vesting in the courts of a state jurisdiction over civil mat-
ters. The Court held that this was impermissible under the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 unless a majority of the tribal citizens
voted for such transfer of jurisdiction.65 In the instant case, the
tribal court is not transferring jurisdiction to the state but rather
is only authorizing the extradition of a tribal citizen to a state
facility under the custody of the federal government for medical
treatment. It is not a permanent transfer or delegation of subject
matter jurisdiction but merely consenting to the intersovereignty
extradition for a specific and humane purpose. In short, it was
merely an exercise of judicial power that Congress has
acknowledged is proper for tribal government in both the Indian
Reorganization Act and in accord with the process established in
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.
III. The Citizenship Issue
Both the federal government and the guardian ad litem argued
that Florence Red Dog, as a state citizen, had a right to medical
services in a state facility under the privileges and immunity
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. This was
63. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
64. 400 U.S. 423 (1970).
65. Id. at 483.
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in rebuttal to the infringement argument of South Dakota. For
some reason they failed to utilize an extradition argument. The
Oglala Sioux Tribe responded that the argument of the federal
government was an infringement on tribal government more than
state jurisdiction was.
The position of the tribe, on a practical level, was that it does
not seem responsible governmental practice to allow tribal
citizens to wander off into state jurisdiction without authority
frorn tribal courts. While it acknowledges that the tribal members
can voluntarily leave the reservation and take up residence
anywhere in the United States without interference from tribal
government, involuntary commitment of a tribal member must be
reviewed by tribal court. The tribe's theory is that if the tribal
government did not take direct responsibility for extradition of
residents on the reserve, it would be possible for either the federal
or the state government to commit tribal citizens to mental in-
stitutions against their will.
Moreover, the Oglala Sioux Tribe argued that as a matter of
treaty federalism and federal law, its tribal citizens were federal
citizens; as federal citizens they were entitled to medical care in
county public health facilities as derivative of the right to travel.
They also argued that this should have been the principle argued
by the federal government.
The federal courts declined to face up to their argument. The
authors believe that as a matter of treaty federalism, constitu-
tional law, and federal law, the position of the Oglala Sioux Tribe
is correct. We will review the historical development of federal
citizenship for the Oglala people, analyze the right of federal
citizens to medical care under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, examine the proposition that tribal
citizens must be state citizens, and conclude by examining these
issues as they intersect with the infringement test the federal
courts followed. Through this process, we can determine the
cogency of the federal government's arguments and the court's
decision.
A. The Historical Development of Federal
Citizenship for Tribal Citizens
Originally tribal citizens were not citizens of either the federal
govermment or state governments. This position was illustrated in
1856 in an opinion of the Attorney General of the United States
to the Secretary of the Interior on the issue of Indian citizenship.
The Attorney General stated: "The fact, therefore, that Indians
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are born in this country does not make them citizens of the
United States."16 Moreover, the Attorney General pointed out
that to become a citizen of the United States, an Indian must
cease to be a member of his- tribe and must throw off the
privileges of tribal membership. This 1856 opinion refers to
previous Attorney General opinions dating as far back as 1831
for this legal principle. 67 The Attorney General also established
the theory that when a non-Indian voluntarily joins himself to a
tribe of Indians, he loses his United States citizenship.68
This legal situation was not changed by the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment. The amendment was interpreted as not
including members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to
their several tribes. 69 The Supreme Court of the United States has
continually affirmed this theory. 70 The only manner of gaining
United States citizenship was to renounce tribal citizenship.
However, Congress had to accept such expatriation before it
became effective. 71 Treaties and special congressional statutes
have adopted the same principles of an individual tribal citizen
gaining United States citizenship."1 The statutory formula of this
period seemed to rest on the assumed incompatibility between
tribal citizenship and United States citizenship." Under those
treaty provisions and statutes, American citizenship was granted
to tribal citizens in exchange for abandoning tribal allegiance,
tribal property rights, and federal services.
Tribal resistance to this formula of obtaining citizenship was
extreme. From the beginning the efforts of the federal govern-
ment to exchange tribal citizenship for federal citizenship was un-
welcome and strongly opposed by the tribal citizens. This attitude
is shown in a report prepared for Congress in 1915. The report
declared that: "The Indian (except in rare individual cases) does
not desire citizenship." 74 The main objection to the federal
66. 70 Op. ATr,Y GEN. (1856), at 746.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. S. REp. No. 268, Effect of the Fourteenth Amendment Upon Indian Tribes, 41st
Cong., 3d Sess. (1870).
70. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U.S. 649, 693 (1898); Ozawa v. United States 260 U.S. 178, 195-96 (1922).
71. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); United States v. Holiday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
406 (1866).
72. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 24, at 153-54.
73. Id. at 154.
74. Id. at 155.
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government formula was the Indians' fear of the termination of
tribal citizenship and the right to tribal government."
This position was modified in 1924, when Congress granted
tribal citizens the right to become American citizens without the
loss of tribal citizenship. By the Act of Congress of June 2, 1924,
all 'Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States
were made national citizens.7 6 The Act specifically stated: "All
non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United
States be, and they are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States." ' 77 The grant of Congress was limited to federal
citizenship.
That the new status of Indians as federal or national citizens of
the United States did not affect their status as tribal citizens, or
the rights and incidents of tribal citizens, is clear from the face of
the Act: "The granting of such citizenship shall not in any man-
ner impair or otherwise affect the rights of any Indian to tribal or
other property. "78 The rights of tribal citizenship were clearly
preserved by Congress for the Indians."
Presumably, Congress could have granted the right to choose
between tribal and state citizenship, but the Indian Citizenship
Act of 1924 did not expressly grant this possibility. The clear in-
tent of Congress was only to offer the tribal citizens the rights-
and privileges of federal citizenship, rather than to force both
federal and state citizenship upon them.
There was no discussion of any basic issue of the bill on the
floor of Congress. The Committee Reports are of little value. The
House Report illustrates that the phrase "full citizenship" was re-
75. Id.
7,. 43 Stat. 253 (1924), 8 U.S.C. § 3 (1926).
77. Id.
73. Id.
79. There is no doubt that tribal citizenship is a property right of members of the
tribe. Since the right to tribal membership is the crux of tribal property rights under cur-
rent law, this status as a member of the polity of the tribe is the source of property rights.
Federal citizenship and tribal citizenship are not incompatible. See United States v. Nice,
241 U.S. 591 (1916) (discusses citizenship and wardship under the Allotment Act); United
States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866) (Court held that even a grant of citizen-
ship by the state of Minnesota to an Indian did not alter his special status as a tribal
member.). See Indian Territory Naturalization Act of 1890. This Act clarifies the nature
of the second sentence of the Indian Citizenship Act. The Naturalization Act of 1890
states "[t]hat the Indians who become citizens of the United States under the provisions
of this act do not forfeit or lose any rights or privileges they enjoy or are entitled to as
members of the tribe or nation to which they belong." 26 Stat. 81, 99-100, § 43.
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jected for the phrase "be a citizen." The purpose or intent of the
bill was stated as follows:
At the present it is very difficult for an Indian to obtain
citizenship without either being allotted and getting a patent in
fee simple, or leaving the reservation and taking up his
residence apart from any tribe of Indians. This legislation will
bridge the present gap and provide a means whereby an Indian
may be given citizenship without reference to the question of
land tenure or the place of his residence .... 10
The Act, entitled "To Authorize the Secretary of the Interior
to Issue Certificates of Citizenship to Indians," was a reversal of
the policy of granting citizenship only to Indians expatriating
themselves from the tribe or giving up tribal residency and rights
under tribal land tenure. The Indian Citizenship Act, as it is now
called, did not force federal citizenship on the tribal citizens. As a
fundamental priniciple of law, citizenship could only be offered
to the individual citizens of the tribe; it could not be imposed ar-
bitrarily without the consent of the individual regardless of race
.or prior political allegiance. In MacKenzie v. Hare,1 the Court
held that: "It may be conceded that a change of citizenship can-
not be arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the concur-
rence of the citizen."1
82
The thrust of the intent of Congress, as well as the wording of
the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, is illustrated by comparing
the wording of the fourteenth amendment to the Indian Citizen-
ship Act. This comparison is also important to illustrate that the
fourteenth amendment did not convey federal or state citizenship
to tribal Indians.
The central purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to convey
both federal and state citizenship on the "inferior and subject
condition" of the black people under the common law of the
United States. 3 In this case, Chief Justice Taney also explained
that Indian governments were foreign governments, to distinguish
80. H. REP. No. 222, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
81. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
82. Id. at 311. See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 377 U.S. 144, 159 n.10
(1963); Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era: The
Ideal of Volitional Allegiance, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY 208 (1974); Wigmore, Domicile,
Double Allegiance, and World Citizenship, 21 ILL. L. REv. (1926) (argues for compulsory
citizenship, but unable to find legal support for the concept in law).
83. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 260 U.S. (19 How.) 293 (1856).
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Indians from black people. 4 The framers of the fourteenth
amendment intended to accomplish the task of incorporating the
black people into the political society of the United States by an
act of Congress, but finally realized that an amendment to the
Constitution was the only sure way to guarantee such a result
because of the history of slavery in America.
The first attempt to grant the black people a right of citizen-
ship was in the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This
Act provided: "[A]U persons born in the United States and sub-
ject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such
citizens, of every race and color, . . . shall have the same rights,
in every state and territory in the United States ... ."" Notice
that this statute only conferred federal citizenship on black peo-
ple."8 Notice also the phrase that "Indians not taxed" were ex-
cluded from this Act. "Indians not taxed" is also a constitutional
category excluded from political representation in the House of
Representatives. 7 This provision had been interpreted to mean
that Indians in a tribal relationship, i.e., tribal citizens," were not
a part of the political community of the United States or the
84. Id. at 404. See also Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21
RUTG RS L. REv. 387 (1867); J. TENBROEK, THE ANTi-SLAvERY ORIGINS OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 183-86, 208 (1951).
85. 14 Stat. 27, ch. 31 § 1, reenacted in Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 144, ch.
114, § 18, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
86. This is a touchy constitutional issue, i.e., whether an act of Congress can modify
the status of blacks or Indians in the Constitution. In contrast to immigrants, the Con-
stitution clearly excepted out the black people and "Indians not taxed" from membership
and equal political status in the federal government. Hence, whether an act of Congress
or a constitutional amendment is necessary to provide both federal and state citizenship is
an opcm question. It should be noted that in Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195-96
(1922), the Court suggested that neither blacks nor tribal Indians could be naturalized. It
is the position of the Oglala Sioux Tribe that only an amendment to the Constitution,
coupled with the consent of the tribe, could grant state citizenship to tribal members.
Some commentators have sought to extract a theory of naturalization for Indians out of
the wording of the Nationality Act of Oct. 14, 1940. The Act declared: "[tihe right to
become naturalized citizens . . . shall extend only to white persons, persons of African
nativity or descent, and descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere."
While it could be argued that this Act was directed to Indians, the vague wording,
however, would urge another explanation, i.e., that it allowed members of other than In-
dian background, e.g., Mexicans and Canadians, to immigrate to the United States and
become citizens.
87. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
88. See S. REp. No. 268, Effect of the Fourteenth Amendment upon Indian Tribes,
41st Cong., 3d Sess. (1870).
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states or territories from which their reservations were
exempted. s9
To ensure both federal and state or territory citizenship to the
black people, the fourteenth amendment was passed. It stated:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside." 90 The amendment was seen
as a more secure form of political guarantee of citizenship than
an act, which could be modified at any time by future congres-
sional action.
By comparing the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, which is still
only an act of Congress, not a constitutional amendment, to the
fourteenth amendment, the difference between tribal citizens and
state citizens can be emphasized. In the Indian Citizenship Act,
like the Civil Rights Act of 1866, only the citizenship of the
United States is granted. There is in Indian legislation no similar
provision to that found in the fourteenth amendment that grants
tribal citizens the citizenship "of the State wherein they reside." 91
In place of granting citizenship similar to. the fourteenth
amendment, Congress reserved the right of Indians to tribal
rights and property.92 Since the Indian Citizenship Act is subse-
quent to the passage of the fourteenth amendment, it is clear that
Congress knew how to grant state citizenship to people in an in-
ferior status if it so desired. There are no debates on the Indian
Citizenship Act, thus the intent of Congress must be derived from
its wording. It is clear from the wording of the statute that the In-
dian Citizenship Act did not intend that Indians on tribal reserva-
tions become state citizens. Furthermore, it is problematic
whether Congress had the authority to naturalize tribal Indians to
state citizenship without a constitutional amendment.93
89. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 24, suggested that Indians automatically
became citizens of the state of their residence through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
156. This conclusion is in direct conflict with the intent and purpose of Congress as ex-
pressed in the Senate Report. It must be remembered in such conflicts that FEDERAL IN-
DIAN LAW is an unofficial treatise of Indian law prepared by the federal government,
which disclaims responsibility for every generalization and disclaims any legal force or
nature of a cyclopedia. Id. at 20, 26. Instead, it states the authority is on the actual deci-
sion of the court's and statute's legislative history and wording. Id.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
91. Id.
92. Indian Citizenship Act, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
93. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195-96 (1922); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94
(1884); United States v. Holiday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1866).
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Once Indians became federal citizens in 1924, however, the
privileges and immunity clause of the fourteenth amendment and
the fifteenth amendment granted tribal citizens certain protec-
tions against the states. The privileges and immunity clause,
which is relevant to the instant case, states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. 9
As Justice Miller observed about the privileges and immunity
clause in the Slaughter-House Cases95 :
[IT]he distinction between citizenship of the United States and
citizenship of a state is clearly recognized and established [by
the] first section of the [fourteenth] amendment. Not only may
a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen
of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the
former into the latter. He must reside within the state to make
him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be
born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the
Union.
It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United
States and a citizenship of a state, which are distinct from each
other, and which depend upon different characteristics or cir-
cumstances in the individual.9 6
This clause did not apply to tribal Indians until the Indian
Citizenship Act of 1924, and then it granted them rights within
the states, but not citizenship while on the tribal reservation. It is
clear, however, that as federal citizens the states cannot abridge
the privileges of federal citizens nor deprive tribal citizens of the
equal protection of the law.
B. The Rights of Federal Citizens to Medical Care
Shapiro v. Thompson9 7 is one of the profoundly seminal deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. In Shapiro v. Thompson the
94.. U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
95. 83 U.S. (16 wall.) 36 (1873).
96. Id. at 39.
97. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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Supreme Court applied the right to travel doctrine with broader
scope than ever before and insured a mobile population the right
to vital government benefits and privileges in the states to which
they migrate. Under the doctrine of Shapiro any federal citizen
can travel to any part of this land, free from any restrictions on
travel and transfer. Four basic principles emerge from Shapiro:
(1) A state may not deny welfare benefits to residents or tran-
sients of less than a year's duration; such a discrimination against
new residents is invidious and denies equal protection of the law.
(2) A one-year waiting period device is well suited to discourage
the influx of poor families in need of assistance, "but the pur-
pose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the state is
constitutionally impermissible." 98 (3) "[A] mere showing of a ra-
tional relationship between the waiting period" and legitimate
state objectives is not enough to justify such a classification; a
compelling governmental interest must be shown." (4) The state
may not condition on residence a denial of public benefits "upon
which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very
means to subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities of life." '
From this nucleus, much case law had developed in a brief
period. The same principles have been applied to health care
restrictions and the hospitalization of mental patients. 1 ' In
Memorial Hospital" 2 the Court ruled that a state law requiring
counties to deny free nonemergency medical care to recently ar-
rived, indigent residents or transients failed to satisfy a compel-
ling governmental interest. As a result the state law individiously
discriminated against the indigent and denied the equal protection
of the law.
Appellant Henry Evaro, an indigent, moved in June, 1971,
from New Mexico to Maricopa County, Arizona. In July he had
a severe respiratory ailment and was sent to Memorial Hospital, a
private, nonprofit community hospital. Pursuant to an Arizona
statute requiring county governments to provide free medical care
to indigents, the hospital requested that Evaro be transferred to a
public facility and claimed reimbursement for the care it had pro-
vided him. Relying on a one-year residency requirement con-
98. Id. at 629.
99. Id. at 634.
100. Id. at 627.
101. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Vaughan v.
Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37, aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 844 (1970).
102. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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tained in a different statute, Maricopa County rejected both re-
quests. Both Memorial Hospital and Evaro sued in state court to
overturn the county's refusal. The trial court held that the twelve-
month residency requirement violated the equal protection clause,
but the Arizona Supreme Court found the statutory scheme con-
stitutional. The United States Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Marshall's opinion for the majority rejected the notion
that either an intent to deter travel or actual deterrence was
necessary to trigger the strict scrutiny test of the state law. 10"
Rather, it determined that such intensive review was appropriate
whenever the denial of a benefit to new persons to the state
"penalized" exercise of the right to travel and settle in a new
state.'04 Although the Court cautioned that withholding some ser-
vices from recent immigrants or transients would not constitute a
"penalty," it found that refusing them nonemergency medical
care-"a basic necessity of life"-required intensive judicial
review.105 Since neither the administrative nor fiscal interest
asserted by the state could withstand such strict scrutiny, the
Court struck down the statute."'
The core question in the Red Dog case'017 is whether a state
could discriminate against residents of an Indian tribal reserva-
tion by denying them the health care it would allow to persons
who had recently migrated to the state on the theory of lack of
jurisdiction.
Florence Red Dog is a citizen of the United States of America.
She is also a citizen and resident of the Oglala Sioux Tribe which
is located on the borders of South Dakota and Nebraska. In the
trial court, it was alleged that because of her residence on the
Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, the federally subsidized county
public health facility had no jurisdiction to provide medical ser-
vices to her, even though the Indian Public Health Service of-
fered to pay the ordinary rate for her medical care.
The position of the Oglala Sioux Tribe was that the fact that
she is a citizen and resident of the tribe is not controlling in deter-
mining her right to medical care, either in a federally subsidized
or nonfederally subsidized public hospital of a county or state.
While her citizenship and residence is a crucial fact in determin-
103. Id. at 257-58.
104. Id. at 256-59.
105. Id. at 259-61.
106. Id. at 262-69.
107. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 545 (D.S.D. 1977).
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ing which government, tribal or state, has the right to commit her
for mental care and treatment, these factors should not be deter-
minative of the issue of where she may receive such care and
treatment.
The issue of state or tribal citizenship, which occupied so much
time and attention in the tribal court and in arguments on appeal,
ignored the higher citizenship that unites tribal and state citizens
into the citizens of the United States of America. This narrow
focus was not justified under the Constitution or the laws of the
United States.
C. Presumptions of State Citizenship
In a series of opinions over the past few years, the lower courts
have misunderstood the holding of Elk v. Wilkins"8 and the
meaning of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 in relationship to
the fourteenth amendment. These cases usually deal with voting
rights of tribal residents in state elections and hold that under the
fourteenth amendment tribal citizens are entitled to vote because
they are United States citizens.
Most members of the legal profession presume that Indians are
citizens of the state where their tribal reservation is located.
Recently, some have attempted to prove this presumption
through the use of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. Many lower courts have ignored the exact
wording and legislative history of the Indian Citizenship Act and
the holding of the Supreme Court in Elk v. Wilkins, ? 9 and have
held that the fourteenth amendment did make the tribal residents
into state citizens.
At the same time that these presumptions were being taken for
law, the Supreme Court had developed a doctrine under the due
process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments dealing
with what has been termed "irrebuttable presumptions" or "con-
clusive presumptions." 110 These cases impose a different constitu-
tional requirement on certain interpretations of statutory
classifications. The statutes involved in these cases contain rules
denying a benefit or placing a burden on all individuals based on
a presumed characteristic. For example, a statute that provides
that if fact "A" exists, fact "B" is also presumed to be present,
108. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
109. Id.
110. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1979
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
contains the prohibited irrebuttable presumption. The presumed
characteristic is interpreted as the "basic fact." A recent Supreme
Court case has held that if it is not "necessarily or universally
true in fact" that the basic fact implies the presumed fact, then
the statute's irrebutable presumption denies due process of law. I I
The near-perfect correspondence between the basic fact and the
presumed fact demanded by the Court appears to impose even
greater scrutiny of statutory classification than the strict scrutiny
test of equal protection cases involving fundamental interests or
suspect classifications." 2 Moreover, the court's concern with the
accuracy of statutory classification bears more resemblance to the
legislative means and ends associated with the equal protection
clause than to the procedural aspect of due process.'II The usual
relief is to award a hearing to the aggrieved party, which con-
forms more to the popular notion of due process.
In practice, the Court has applied this as a rule of construction
to invalidate only those statutes where the presumed facts in-
fringed on a fairly fundamental interest.I" Employing this limited
procedural method of statutory interpretation and classification
against state action, the Court can decide that the state interest
was insufficiently compelling to justify a conclusive presumption
in a statutory scheme and hold that due process required an in-
dividual hearing to allow a person to rebut the presumption,.
while not expanding the categories of fundamental interest or
.suspect classification." 5 Under this judicial process the Court
could remand the statute to the state legislature to redraft the
classification more narrowly." 6 In sum, the conclusive presump-
tion analysis proscribes certain laws and regulations that place in-
dividuals or groups in disadvantageous categories based on legal
presumptions but does not reach the question of whether the
underlying categorization is itself unconstitutional.
In terms of asserting state citizenship for tribal residents, courts
have held that if tribal citizens are citizens of the United States
they are also citizens of the states. This is almost identical to the
111. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
112. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 519 (1973).
113. Id.
114. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (right to procreate, sex as
a suspect class); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (wealth
as a suspect class); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (sex as a suspect class).
115. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine of a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rnv. 1 (1972).
116. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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proscribed interpretations addressed by the Supreme Court in its
analysis of conclusive presumptions. It is also constitutional
federalism with treaty federalism.
An example of this leap in logic is Goodluck v. Apache Coun-
ty." 7 In Goodluck the district court assumed that the first
sentence in the fourteenth amendment applied to Indians." 8 At
no time did the court look at the legislative history of the Indian
Citizenship Act of 1924, but found that 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) was
dispositive. Moreover, the court attempted to distinguish Elk v.
Wilkins"9 and the Report of the Judiciary Committee on the
theory that Congress overruled the Supreme Court when it
enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2).120
The logic of the district court was that:
Since Congress did act constitutionally in granting citizenship
to reservation Indians, and since, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Indians are also citizens of Arizona, and
since the Arizona Constitution allows the Indians to vote, the
defendants' equal protection and due process arguments ap-
pear to be premature for adjudication.' 2'
The court failed, however, to point out that only federal
citizenship was granted in the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,
which was codified later as a section of 8 U.S.C. § 1401. It also
failed to understand that if its argument were correct, why would
Congress have taken the time to pass the Indian Citizenship Act
at all?
The district court also failed to see that the rights of tribal
citizens as federal citizens are guaranteed under the fourteenth
amendment as one of the "privileges and immunities." Such
right is not guaranteed under the "citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside" clause of that amendment.
This status is analytically distinct. The district court also failed to
see that as a constitutional principle, it would take an amendment
similar to the fourteenth amendment to grant full citizenship to
tribal citizens (under their limited status in the Constitution), as
well as the volitional consent of the tribes and their individual
members.
22
117. 417 F. Supp. 13 (D. Ariz. 1975).
118. Id. at 14-15.
119. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
120. Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Ariz. 1975).
121. Id.
122. See Section II B, supra, this article.
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This case looks at state citizenship as mandated merely because
the Arizona constitution allows the Indians to vote. This is exactly
the evil (the "conclusive presumptions" standard) the Supreme
Court seeks to prohibit. As an issue of judicial process, citizen-
ship cannot be forced on any resident by a law or constitution.
The question of citizenship in a state is voluntary. Citizenship
cannot be forced on any person under the legal theory of
"democracy. ' 123 In addition, there is no provision for tribal
citizens under the court's theory of state citizenship. Unlike the
Indian Citizenship Act, the state statute does not provide for
triba. citizens.
There is no near-perfect correspondence between the basic fact
of federal-tribal citizenship under the Indian Citizenship Act of
1924. and with state citizenship to justify the judicial presump-
tion. A more correct approach to voting rights is the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal's holding in Little Thunder v. South
Dakota."12 The Eighth Circuit held that the validity of restricting
tribal citizens from voting in county government elections was to
be determined from the constitutional test of a compelling state
interest test, not the rational basis test. 121 Moreover, it held that
there was no compelling state interest to justify the denial to
tribal citizens of the right to vote for county government of-
ficials. 12 6 The key to this holding is that tribal citizens have a
substantial interest in the choice of county officials independent
from their status as reservation Indians. This is true because the
county government appears to exercise substantial power over the
affairs of individual Indians living in the unorganized counties.
The Eighth Circuit in Little Thunder v. South Dakota uses an
"equal protection of the laws" argument, but it did not hold that
the fourteenth amendment granted them status as state citizens.
Moreover, its utilization of Dunn v. Blumstein'2 illustrates that
the Eighth Circuit saw the problem as a right-to-travel case, i.e.,
the rights and privileges of federal citizenship under the four-
teenth amendment.
12'
State citizenship is not necessary for members of the tribe. As
federal-tribal citizens, residents of the reserves can enjoy all the
123. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era:
The Idea of Volitional Allegiance, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HisrORY 108 (1974).
124. 518 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1975).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1255.
127. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
128. Little Thunder v. South Dakota, 518 F.2d 1253, 1255 (8th Cir. 1975).
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rights and privileges of other citizens of the United States through
the rights and privileges clause of the fourteenth amendment, as
well as under the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution.
The right to vote, as explained by Cohen, is a right of the fif-
teenth amendment." 9 The fifteenth amendment declares: "The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude."' 30 As federal citizens,
tribal members are entitled to the rights of suffrage and entitled
to hold public office.' No resort to arguments of state citizen-
ship is necessary. No presumption of state citizenship is necessary
to protect tribal Indians' rights in the surrounding states.
IV. The Ignored Federal Laws
Federal statutes resolve the central issue in the case. The
federal district court discussed the Indian Health Care Improve-
ment Act of 1976, but it failed to examine the more relevant
federal statutory schemes for distribution of state aid for sub-
sidizing and regulating state health services and the prevention of
discrimination on the basis of race in federally subsidized health
care services. These issues were raised only by the attorney for the
Oglala Sioux Tribe on the appeal. The lawyers for the guardian
of Florence Red Dog, the state of South Dakota, and the federal
government were silent as to these points of law.
We shall present the federal scheme for regulating the distribu-
tion of state aid for health services and examine the declaration
of South Dakota to determine if South Dakota committed itself
to serve the mental health needs of reservation residents as a con-
dition of continued federal funding, which is contrary to its
arguments before the federal courts. Next, we shall determine the
relevancy of racial discrimination issues in this case. Finally, we
shall look at the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976 to
assess why these services were not provided on the reservation.
A. The Federal Scheme for Regulating the
Distribution of State Aid. of Health Services
Federal funding of state health and mental health services is
chiefly governed by two acts: The Public Health Service Act of
129. Cohen, The Spanish Origins of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31
GEo. L.J. 1, 3 (1942).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. 15.
131. Cohen, supra note 129.
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1944,1132 as amended by the National Health Planning and
Resource Development Act of 1974133 and by Title I of the
Special Health Revenue Sharing Act of 1975' 34, and the Com-
munity Mental Health Centers Act of 1963. ' 3 The amended
Public Health Service Act authorizes funding of comprehensive
health services delivery programs. The amended Community
Mental Health Centers Act specially allocates funding for the
decentralization of mental health programs.
Under both acts, certain enumerated territories' 3 are the
primary units of administration, eligible to apply for formula and
project grants and accountable for program management. Never-
theless, neither act suggests any congressional intent that program
beneficiaries be limited to citizens, residents, or eligible voters of
the states and named territories. The explicit purpose of the
Public Health Service Act is "to assure comprehensive health ser-
vices for every person." Each state and territory is entitled to
receive a proportion of annual appropriations adjusted to its
"population and financial need" and must devote a minimum
share of its allocation to the provision of mental health care.
37
The concept of service population or clientele is geographical,
not political, as made clear by Public Law 94-63's amendments to
both acts. The Special Health Revenue Sharing Act, Public Law
94-63, defines the basic unit of mental health care planning and
service delivery as the "catchment area," a purely geographical
unit which may or may not coincide with existing political sub-
division boundaries. The purpose of community mental health
centers is to "bring comprehensive mental health care to all in
need within a specific geographic area regardless of ability to
pay."'13 Each federally funded center must provide services "to
any individual residing or employed in such area regardless of his
ability to pay for such services, his current or past health condi-
tion, or any other factor. ' 13 9 In the preamble of the amend-
ments, Congress declared its policy to be that community mental
132. 58 Stat. 682.
133. Pub. L. 93-641, 42 U.S.C. § 300(K).
134. Pub. L. 94-63, 42 U.S.C.
135. Pub. L. 88-164, as amended by Title III of Pub. L. 94-63.
136. The enumerated territories are Guam, Puerto Rico, Samoa, the Trust Territories
of the Pacific, and the Virgin Islands. The District of Columbia is also included. 42
U.S.C. § 246(g)(4)(B), as amended.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 246(d), as amended.
138. Pub. L. 94-63, § 32(a), 42 U.S.C.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2689(a)(1)(B), as amended.
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health centers are "a national resource to which all Americans
should enjoy equal access." ' 14
0
Similarly, the 1974 amendments to the comprehensive health
provision of the Public Health Service Act defined the primary
unit of health planning to be "health service areas," that is,
"geographic region[s] appropriate for the effective planning and
development of health services."'"' 1 Like the Community Mental
Health Centers Act amendments, the "umbrella act" avoided any
hint of geographical discrimination. Congress specifically found
that, "The achievement of equal access to quality health care at a
reasonable cost is a priority of the Federal Government." 4 ' The
amendments further gave priority to "primary care services for
medically underserved populations, especially those which are
located in rural or economically depressed areas. ' ' 41 This priority
describes tribal citizens and residents of tribal reservations and
contains no hint of an intent to exclude them.
In summary, the laws controlling federal funding of local
health and mental health services are directed broadly at "all
Americans" and "every person," and accordingly, while they
designated the states and certain territories as eligible applicants,
they make eligibility for receipt of services geographical rather
than political. This is consistent with the constitutional require-
ment, discussed in section III, supra, that state and local agencies
cannot deny services to indigents on the basis of local citizenship,
residence, or alienage. Federally subsidized health and mental
health care is a right of all persons who seek it from participating
agencies under the modem statutory scheme for the delivery of
health care and services.
Despite the repeated disclaimers of the office of the South
Dakota Attorney General in a "Memorandum in Opposition to
Federal Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Support of State Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,"
filed with the district court, the state of South Dakota par-
ticipates in federal health funding, albeit to a lesser degree than
most states."' About 68 percent of the state's community mental
health center expenditures in fiscal year 1977 were from federal
140. Pub. L. 94-63, § 302(a) (emphasis ours), 42 U.S.C.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 300(1), amending former § 1511(a)(1).
142. Pub. L. 93-641, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 300(k).
143. Pub. L. 93-641, § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 300(k)(2).
144. South Dakota Mental Health State Plan, Fiscal Year (FY) 1978, 279-80
[hereinafter referred to as Plan).
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sources.1, State projections place the federal share of the cost of
all state mental health programs at 14 percent in FY 1977, in-
creasing to 33 percent by FY 1979.146 The state's plan, on which
these figures are based, was prepared to make the state eligible
for Public Health Service Act and Community Mental Health
Centers Act funding.
The instant case involves the South Dakota Human Services
Cernter, the state's mental hospital. From 1968 to 1977, the
federal government contributed between 9 percent and 18 percent
of the support for the Center.' 47 The Honorable Richard Kneip,
governor of the state of South Dakota, supplied figures for the
Center's FY 1979 budget, indicating a 19 percent federal share.'
48
The federal share includes Title XVIII-XX of the Social Security
Act, as amended, and Medicaid reimbursements, as well as grants
under the Public Health Services Act.
As a principle of federal law, the state of South Dakota cannot
accept these funds while denying services to federal citizens, or
"al Americans," and "every person" within the geographical
area described in its applications to the federal government. In-
dians residing on reservations within the catchment areas,
established by South Dakota expressly for the purpose of
"enab[ling] mental health centers to qualify for and apply for
federal funds through P.L. 94-63," are federal citizens and per-
sons within the geographical area. Moreover, they are specifically
included in the state's projections of further Human Service
Center needs in the state's request for federal funding. 149 Thus,
contrary to the Memorandum filed with the lower court by the
state, the state does apply for federal aid on the basis of serving
all persons-including all reservation Indians-within its exterior
boundaries, just as federal law contemplates. 1°
Based on the foregoing analysis, Congress could, presumably,
in the exercise of its treaty obligations as codified in the Snyder
Act, make separate provision for the delivery of health care
145. Id. at 294.
146. Id. at 298.
147. Id. at 126.
148. Letter of Mar. 17, 1978, to counsel for the Oglala Sioux Tribe.
149. Plan 67, supra note 144, at 106, 108, 147-50.
150. Based on the principle and authority of the Indian Self-Determination Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 450, et seq., the Oglala Sioux Tribe would be agreeable to a reduction of state
projected need to exclude reservation Indians, provided that the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare is agreeable to remitting the fiscal difference to the tribe for pro-
vision or purchase of services for its members.
151. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
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and services to tribal residents-as indeed it has in the Indian
Health Care Improvement Act of 1977.112 Under treaty
federalism, Congress has the obligation and power to provide
specially for tribal Indians; 1 3 insofar as the classification is
political, rather than racial, general federal laws are said to apply
to Indians in the absence of express exemption.""'
B. The State Mental Health Plan of South Dakota
Both Public Laws 93-641 and 94-63 require, as a precondition
to federal funding, submission of a state plan to the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, and subsequent approval by the
Secretary. Judging from the priorities and guidelines set out in
these two amendatory acts, the intent of Congress was to require
grantees to develop and implement plans to assure all persons ac-
cess to coordinated, cost-effective, and nonduplicative health ser-
vices facilities.
In amending the Public Health Service Act, Public Law 93-641
identified health service areas and mandated appointment of
health service agencies and state health coordinating councils to
prepare, annually review and revise, and assure the compliance of
all applications for federal health funding with a state health ser-
vices plan.1 "5 Each health service agency within a state is to pro-
pose its own local Health Systems Plan (HSP) and Annual Im-
plementation Plans (AIP) and, subject to state council approval,
"shall implement its HSP and AIP., ,116 Approved plans therefore
appear to be binding on the state, as well as a precondition for
federal financial assistance.
Title I, Section 102 of Public Law 94-63 amends the Public
Health Service Act to require that grantees assure the Secretary
they will administer comprehensive health services in accordance
with their approved plans and, moreover, to provide that the
Secretary "may not approve" an application for funding if it is
152. Pub. Law 94-437, 42 U.S.C. (1970).
153. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Delaware Business Council v.
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
154. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); Chateau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931).
A different rule applies where a general act would have the effect of diminishing tribal
authority or the size of the reservation, or delegating jurisdiction over a reservation to
state government. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 300(m), as amended.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 300(1)(2), as amended. Pub. L. 93-641 also created a new program
of federally subsidized construction, requiring secretarial approval of Medical Facilities
Plans to be administered by applicants. 42 U.S.C. § 300(o)(2), as amended.
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found that applicants have not complied with assurances made in
connection with prior grants. 5 7 Title III, Section 303 of the same
law amends the Community Mental Health Centers Act to condi-
tion all grants on secretarial approval of a state plan, and to re-
quire the Secretary to accept grant applications only if he finds
the applicants have "complied with the assurances which were
contained in" previous applications."' A state's mental health
plan must be consistent with its comprehensive health plan, and
the applicant state agency is accountable for its administration.' 9
South Dakota's FY 1978 Mental Health Plan is replete with ex-
plicit commitments to improve, increase, and diversify mental
health services for reservation citizens and residents; to include
both the Indian Health Service and tribal governments in the
planning process; and to arrange for nonduplicative or com-
plementary sharing of service responsibilities with the federal and
tribal governments.
It is astonishing that the state, which wrote the plan, and the
United States, which accepted it and extended funding on the
basis of it, both disclaimed any responsibility for tribal citizens
and residents on reservations in terms of medical and mental
health services. The South Dakota State's Memorandum, filed in
the district court, is instructive of its legal position. The Attorney
General of South Dakota stated:
Medical services to Pine Ridge Indian residents, however, are
100% federally funded.... Once again, in their zeal to show
that they are on the side of the Oglala Sioux, Federal Defend-
ants make a very serious accusation without any basis of fact.
The Fact is that this case is a result of Federal Defendants'
smug refusal to carry out their responsibility to provide
medical services, including mental health services, to Indian
persons located on Indian reservations in South Dakota ...
Two federal responsibilities specifically set forth in South
Dakota law are armed forces personnel from military reserva-
tions (SDCL 27-4-15) and Indian persons from Indian reserva-
tions (SDCL 1-23-11).... In short, the South Dakota Human
Services Center is neither funded or structured to carry out the
157. 42 U.S.C. § 246(d), as amended.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2698(t), as amended. Each individual grant program reiterates the
requirements of a mental health plan condition of application. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2689(a), (b),
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responsibilities of the tribe and the United States to provide
mental health care to reservation Indians in South Dakota.
Fiscal responsibility by a state agency is not constitutionally
impermissible.... State Defendants are happy to fully discuss
the history of responsibility to provide medical services to In-
dian persons residing on Indian reservations in South Dakota.
State Defendants will not, however, allow the Federal Defend-
ant to twist the facts or selectively present the facts so as to
support their accusations of racism and divert the Court's at-
tention from the real issue in this case (i.e. the responsibility of
the United States to provide medical services, including mental
health services, to Indian persons residing on Indian Reserva-
tions in South Dakota.
1 60
Absent an amendment to the state law, it is arguable that the
state of South Dakota and the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare have complied with the mandates of the modem
congressional scheme for accountability, without any expectation
of consequent liability. South Dakota law makes it the "duty" of
the Division of Mental Health and Mental Retardation "to accept
the benefit of . . . federal statutes and acts . . . and to comply
with the requirements thereof."1 61 It is a class 1 misdemeanor for
any state mental health officer to "intentionally refuse or neglect
to perform his duty. '
162
Before the federal courts the state was unwilling or unable
under the state law to comply with its submitted plan. The court
could have required it to remit to the Secretary all federal funds
received for the delivery of services to tribal residents and
citizens, so that the Indian tribes would be free to receive those
funds and apply them, as Congress intended, for the relief of
reservation residents' medical and mental health needs.16 3
A brief summary of South Dakota's 1978 Mental Health Plan
will establish a framework to evaluate its present policy. It will
also illustrate the breadth of the commitments made to the
federal government in consideration for federal financial
assistance.
160. State Defendant's Memorandum, in Brief, at 5, 7-8, 9-10 (Jan. 17, 1977).
161. S.D. Comp. LAws.§ 27A-3-3 and 27A-3-4.
162. Id. § 27a-1-6.
163. The Oglala Sioux Tribe, for its part, contemplates eventual assumption of
primary responsibility for mental health care on the Pine Ridge Reservation, consistent
with the policy of Congress declared in section 3 of the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450a.
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The state plan identifies Indians as a "high-risk" population
and declares an "urgent responsibility on the state to plan for ad-
ditional services to this group."' 6 The state admits having given
"too little consideration of the special needs, desires, and culture
of the Indian population served," and concludes that "[m]ental
health planning in South Dakota will need to take into considera-
tion the needs, desires, customs, and history of the Sioux
people."16 Ten pages of the text of the state plan are devoted to
background information of the demography, economy, and men-
tal health needs of the nine Indian reservations located within the
state's borders.
1 66
South Dakota employs the proportion of reservation Indians
residing within a "catchment area" as one of eight indicators of
relative need for mental health services expansion.' 67 Rank-
ordering of catchment areas by need is required by Public Law
94-63 and is the basis for interstate allocation by federal com-
munity mental health funds. Significantly, the state's Central and
West River Catchment Areas, which surround the majority of
tribal reservations, rank first and second, respectively, in the
state's assessment of need. The state's plan, therefore, not only
presupposes delivery of services to Indian reservations but ex-
pressly gives priority to reservation areas for federal financial
assistance.
The state's mental health services' objectives, outlined in five-
year (1978-1982) plans, include doubling serv'ices to Indians over
what was provided in FY 1977 (when the state argued it provided
no services to tribal residents in its Memorandum),
"[e]stabish[ing] specialized services for Indian clients"; and
"provid[ing] specialized services or approaches for Indian per-
sons with emotional, behavioral, drug, or alcohol problems
which are relevant to the cultural knowledge." 6 8
The state mental health plan is explicit that "[t]he South
Dakota Human Services Center, the state's mental hospital,
serves all residents of the state, including the reservation Indian
population."6 9 The state plan, moreover, explains that:
164. Plan, supra note 144, at 58-59, 61.
165. Id. at 51, 57.
166. Id. at 47-58.
167. Id. at 106, 108.
168. Id. at 192, 208.
169. Id. at 53 (emphasis ours).
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An amendment to the mental health law was passed by the
1977 legislature which makes it mandatory for the county to
pay the $100 [montly fee] for indigent residents admitted to the
Human Services Center. This now makes it possible for all
residents of the state, including Indians from reservations, to
receive needed mental health services regardless of ability to
pay.170
Although the office of the Attorney General has continued to
proclaim that the state will not accept direct commitment orders
by tribal courts (see supra at note 160), the state declared as one
of its goals for 1978 the preparation of a booklet on state com-
mitment procedures to be sent both to state attorneys and to
tribal court officers.171 A reasonable interpretation of this is as
follows: not only does the state pledge not to deny services to
reservation Indians, but indeed the state will follow its own com-
mitment procedures, which have already been prohibited by the
district court opinion in this case.
The state's FY 1978 Mental Health State Plan further explains
that while community mental health centers have generally not
been serving reservation Indians, they hope to arrange to do so as
soon as they are federally funded: "West River Mental Health
Center and the Indian Health Service, Oglala Community Col-
lege, and the tribal health board on the Pine Ridge Reservation
are developing a written working agreement which will specify
staff and service to be provided by the West River comprehensive
grant on Pine Ridge."
17 2
The state reported to the federal government that: "Most ob-
jectives regarding continuity of care between the Human Services
Center and community mental health centers and among com-
munity providers (community mental health centers, Indian
Health Service, and drug and alcohol programs) were achieved or
partially achieved in 1977." ' l
According to the state plan, the Indian Health Service and
tribal input and participation are promoted at every level. The In-
dian Health Service was involved in preparing the FY 1978 plan,
and IHS is identified as a health resource for statewide mental
health planning. 7 ' Richard Varner, Chief of Social Services and
170. Id. at 54 (emphasis ours).
171. Id. at 210.
172. Id. at 55.
173. Id. at 22.
174. Id. at 196.
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Mental Health in the Indian Health Service's Aberdeen area, is
identified as a member of the South Dakota Mental Health Ad-
visory Council,"' and the
Indian Health Service and the state agencies agree that their
services" should be complementary, not duplicating, and that
full, ongoing consultation is necessary to strengthen both
systems. They also agree on the concept of a unified delivery
system and the state and federal agencies will cooperate in
developing such a system.' 76
Tribal governments were "invited to participate in all planning
efforts in mental health," including "expanding services in catch-
ment areas which are developing comprehensive centers and will
be seeking funds under P.L. 94-63," and the development of a
special Indian inpatient unit (we have been unable to locate any
invitation to the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council, however). 177
"There is Indian representation on all mental health center
boards which have reservations in their service areas," and "the
mental health centers developing comprehensive services have or
are in the process of developing working arrangements with tribal
councils, tribal health programs, and Indian Health Service to
supplement mental health services on reservations rather than
setting up duplicative systems."' 78
Five-year objectives continue this theme, setting as goals
"[e]stablishing an ongoing committee with representatives from
tribal and Indian Health Service, and community providers of
mental health, drug, and alcohol services for the purpose of
planning services; educating community providers in special
needs and service delivery considerations of Indian people"; and
developing "strong ties and mutually supportive working rela-
tionships" with mental health training programs on the Pine
Ridge and Rosebud reservations. 79 Committees are to be
established that will include Indian Health Service representation
for the purposes of developing Human Services Center admission
policies and interagency transfer policies. 80 Overall, the plan em-
17:5. Id. at 38.
176. Id. at 15, 24, 189-90. The Plan also pledges coordination with the State Office of
Indian Affairs. Id. at 17-18.
177. Id. at 18-19, 57.
1711. Id. at 25.
179. Id. at 208, 270, 296.
180. Id. at 162-63.
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phasizes existing and expanding relationships of cooperation and
sharing of responsibility.
Upon reviewing the state plan, one would never suspect that
the state of South Dakota denies mental health services to reser-
vation Indians, or that the state and the United States would
assume an adversary posture in the instant case. Although the
state argues, correctly, that the Indian Health Service "has the
primary responsibility for reservation Indian health care,"' 8 the
state, as a foundation for federal funding, consistently maintains
that it is exercising a responsibility to serve reservation Indians'
mental health needs and developing toward a unified, shared
responsibility approach. In short, "intergovernmental coopera-
tion."
If the state's representations to the federal government in its
approved Mental Health Plan are materially false, or if stated
guidelines and objectives are not complied with, the state should
not be eligible for further Public Laws 94-63 or 93-641 funding.
By default, then, tribal governments should be eligible for such
funding; the health of tribal citizens and residents must not be
harmed by the actions of the state of South Dakota and its of-
ficials.
Either the federal courts have a responsibility to compel the
state to honor its commitments, -or the United States has a
responsibility to deny further funding to the state for services to
tribal citizens and residents. But both courts have refused to act.
The United States, by its appearance, chose a judicial rather than
an administrative solution to rectify the actions of the state of
South Dakota. We concede the parties have placed the courts in a
most uncomfortable position by neglecting the clear and direct
remedy of challenging the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare to take action against the state as a whole.
It should be said that we do not imply South Dakota bears sole
or even primary responsibility for Indian mental health care. Our
argument is simply that by drafting a plan and accepting federal
funds in accordance with it, the state had committed itself to pro-
vide those services described in the plan to the best of its ability.
Compliance with the plan is both a condition subsequent to the
use and enjoyment of funds already granted, and a condition
precedent to all future applications for funding. The state may, if
it chooses, alter its plan and remit from what it has received,
181. Id. at 52.
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assuming the Secretary will approve the change as not inconsis-
tent with the Public Health Service Act's sweeping mandate.
C. Racial Discrimination Issue
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964112 prohibits discrimina-
tion in the provision of federally subsidized services. This pro-
hibition is applicable to the Public Health Service Act and Com-
munity Mental Health Centers Act."8 3 Accordingly, South
Dakota in its Mental Health Plan gives assurance that, in com-
pliance with these,'" it will not discriminate on the basis of
"race, color, creed, religion, sex, ancestry, or' national
origins."III
While tribal citizens or Indian residents on a tribal reservation
are under federal law a political entity and not a racial classifica-
tion,'86 once they exit the tribal boundaries they are viewed as
representing a racial classification under existing federal law.
Even if South Dakota's denial of services to Ms. Red Dog were
permissible either as a geographical or political discrimination, it
was certainly impermissible as discrimination on the basis of her
birth into a race, or of her ancestry, or of her national origin.
Would the Human Services Center have denied services to an in-
digent citizen of Nebraska or Canada under similar cir-
cumstances? South Dakota law provides for the transportation of
a resident of another state "to a similar institution of such
state," at South Dakota's expense,"17 but this does not preclude
treatment of persons who cannot be moved or whose state of
residence cannot provide services. Indeed, in 1976, seven percent
of the persons treated by the Human Services Center were not
identified as to any county of South Dakota."'
In addition, South Dakota subscribes to an Interstate Compact
on Mental Health, which in Article I provides that
the necessity of and desirability for furnishing such "proper
and expeditious" care and treatment bears no primary relation
to the residence or citizenship of the patient but that, on the
182. 42 U.S.C.- § 2000(d).
183. 42 C.F.R. 51.8, app.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) and S.D. CoMp. LAWS § 20-13-24.
185. Plan, supra note 144, at 34, 308.
186. Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974).
187. S.D. COMP. LAWS § 27A-4-15.
188. Plan, supra note 144, at 150 (Table.12).
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contrary, the controlling factors of community safety and
humanitarianism requires that facilities and services be made
available for all who are in need of them. 189
In other words, South Dakota law declares residence and
citizenship inappropriate standards for eligibility for "proper and
expeditious" treatment. The tribe does not doubt, from the
record below, the plaintiff's situation was one involving "com-
munity safety" and an absence of appropriate on-reservation
facilities. South Dakota appears to have refused her, then,
because of some other factor. We suggest it was her race. If we
are correct, South Dakota failed to comply with its Mental
Health Plan, thereby violating its own law as well as the laws of
the United States.
The state holds that the reason was lack of jurisdiction over
tribal citizens on the reservation, but the state of South Dakota
should have been stopped from arguing residence on the reserva-
tion because it was the actions of the state and its officials that
kept Florence Red Dog on the tribal reservation. The tribal court
had ordered extradition of Florence Red Dog to the nearest
health facility and the state's refusal created the residency ques-
tion.
D. The Indian Health Care Improvement Act
The obligation and responsibilities of the federal government
for Indian health is also statutory. The Indian Health Care Im-
provement Act of 1976190 declares that: "Federal -health services
to maintain and improve the health of the Indians are consonant
with and required by the Federal Government's historical and
unique relationship with, and resulting responsibility to the
American Indian people."' 91 The Act's purpose is to raise Indian
health "to the highest possible level" by providing the Indian
Health Service with "all resources necessary" for attainment of
that goal, including additional funding for direct care, facility
construction, and training. 92 The Indian Health Care Improve-
ment Act is an expansion and clarification of the health services
provisions of the Snyder Act, 193 itself a compilation and
189. S.D. COMP. LAWS § 27A-6-1.
190. Pub. L. 94-437, 42 U.S.C.
191. 25 U.S.C. § 1601(a), 2(a).
192. 25 U.S.C. § 1601(b), 1602, 2(b), 3.
193. 42 Stat. 208 (1921), 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1979
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
systematization of former treaty obligations for Indian health and
welfare services.
94
The Indian Health Care Improvement Act specifically
authorizes the appropriation of funds, increasing to $5 million by
FY 1980, and creation of one hundred new IHS positions for
community mental health services, inpatient mental health ser-
vices, residential treatment centers, and other mental health pro-
grams.' "95 Most important, this authorization includes $800,000
and twenty positions for the kinds of inpatient and residential
services the United States here argues it has neither facilities nor
any obligation to provide. IHS inpatient mental health treatment
is clearly mandated and funded.
The Act's mental health authorizations are to be used for
"eliminating backlogs in Indian health care services and to supply
known, unmet... Indian health needs."' 9 For the purposes of
the Act, an Indian is any member of an Indian tribe "irrespective
of whether he or she lives on or near a reservation."' 97
Conclusion
The federal government did not explain why Public Law 94-437
funds are not available to serve and treat Florence Red Dog. If
they have been spent elsewhere or on other forms of mental
health services, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.is
accountable to Ms. Red Dog to demonstrate that such expen-
ditures are consistent with the purposes and priorities of the Act;
Ms. Red Dog, through her guardian ad litem, would have stand-
ing to challenge an allocation that unreasonably denied her, and
persons in her position, the benefits intended by Congress.
"Tbis may raise questions of the availability of administrative
remedies within the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, to be pursued before appealing to the courts. Be that as
it may, the Act creates a right for Florence Red Dog, and the
Secretary, through budget allocation and spending policies, can-
not deny her that right without due process of law and a showing
of reasonable grounds.
The federal government attempted to use the concepts of ward-
ship, conquest, and the plenary powers of Congress as justifica-
194. 61 CONG. REC. 4659-4691 (Aug. 4, 1921).
195. 25 U.S.C. § 1601(c)(4), 201(e)(4).
196. 25 U.S.C. § 1621(a), 201(a).
197. 25 U.S.C. § 1603(c), 4(c).
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tion for nonfunding of mental services on the reservation. Its
arguments sought to excuse the federal government from respon-
sibilities for mental and health care on the reservations. It argued
"specific expenditures and authorizations theory of appropria-
tions," which existed before the Snyder Act, knowing full well
that the delivery of post-1870 services are totally insufficient to
meet the modem needs for either federal, tribal, or state citizens.
Not only is this totally contrary to the intent and policy of Con-
gress as established in the Snyder Act of 1921, the Indian Citizen-
ship Act of 1924, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the In-
dian Civil Rights Act of 1968, and the Indian Self-Determination
and Higher Education Act of 1975, but it is also contrary to the
general health care legislation outlined earlier.
Under this uniform congressional scheme, tribal citizens are
eligible for the benefits of the privileges and immunities of federal
citizens, but these do not interfere with their essential tribal rela-
tionship. The privileges and immunities of United States citizen-
ship grants tribal citizens the right to state services as well as
federal services, independent of their place of residence. This is
the law of the land in conjunction with treaties. These are the
substantive rights of the citizens of the Oglala Sioux Tribe under
treaty and under constitutional federalism. This is contemporary
congressional and tribal policy, in opposition to the misty pro-
positions of "guardianship," "wardship," and "conquest" that
were generated by the ideology of the social Darwinism of
another era. To its credit, the federal courts were not convinced
that the federal government had no responsibilities in the health
care on the reservation. Unfortunately, they only saw one side of
the issue. By holding the federal government responsible they
limited the right of tribal residents to travel in the United States.
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